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Abstract: Why do parties offer environmental policies in their political programs? While a 
number  of  papers  examine the  determinants  of  citizens’ pro-environmental  behaviour,  we 
know  little  about  the  extent  to  which  political  parties  adjust  their  platform  towards 
environmentalism. We investigate this process through data provided by the Manifesto Project 
Dataset (CMP) for 20 European countries over the period 1970-2008. Following the literature 
on public concern towards environment, we examine economic, environmental and political 
determinants. Our findings provide evidence that political parties’ environmental concern is 
strongly correlated with their political ideology and with country-level economic conditions.
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I. Introduction
Public policy is probably the main channel for environmental quality improvement. Laws, 
regulations, and incentives are joint determinants of environmental policy outcome and the 
political decision making process a core element of environmental quality improvement. A 
common shared view claims that once a certain level of development is achieved, citizens pay 
greater attention to environmental amenities, leading new institutions to emerge (Arrow et al. 
1995).  While  there  is  an  extended  literature  on  both,  private  determinants  of  pro-
environmental behavior (see Torgler and Garcías-Valiñas 2007; Aklin et al. 2013) and public 
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preferences and green voting (see Schumacher, 2014), we know little about political parties’ 
motivations  to  provide  environmental  policies.  Although  some authors  suggest  there  is  a 
political market for environmental issues (Graman, 2014; Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003) 
and there is evidence on the political parties’ concern since the 70s (Tognacci et al. 1972), the 
driving forces behind it remain imprecise. Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate 
the determinants of environmental concern in electoral platforms since 1970.
Most  studies  dealing  with  the  environmental  policies  offer  have  looked  at  political 
competition or parties’ internal organization. The formers assume that political competition 
raises  the  stringency  of  environmental  policies  (Fredriksson  et  al.,  2005).  Environmental 
issues are strategic items that politicians would manipulate to attract ‘single issue voters’ (List 
and Sturm, 2004). In this sense, parties are responsive to both, the opportunity to attract new 
voters and the electoral green threat from niche parties (Spoon et al.,  2014). Idiosyncratic 
characteristics of parties, such as political stability, also affect environmental policy outcomes.  
Party discipline and party strength for example, by offering greater national perspectives to 
politicians,  provide incentives to  act in  line with the party political  line (Fredriksson and 
Wollscheid,  2014).  This  reduces  spillover  damages  due  to  local  decision-making  and 
strengthens environmental policy strictness. 
Our main contribution here is to investigate environmental policy offer through individual 
preferences.  We provide a first  measure of the salience of this issue in european political  
programs since 1970, and contribute to fill the gap between studies based on US data and 
those based on European ones in this field. Following a market-based approach of the political 
game,  we  focus  on  the  demand-side  characteristics.  We  investigate  how  individuals’ 
determinants  of  attitudes  towards  environment  impact  environmental  policy  offer  during 
political  campaign.  Precisely,  we  consider  the  extent  to  which  a  well-identified  range  of 
determinants - environmental quality, socio-economic conditions, and political ideologies - 
affect green policies offer in political programs. 
The purpose of this paper is achieved through an empirical analysis that relies on data drawn 
from the Comparative Manifesto Database (CMD) which allow the observation of parties’ 
political platforms. Precisely, we investigate the supply of environmentalism as measured by 
the percentage of sentences devoted to environment-related issues in their electoral programs. 
This  Indeed, the CMD data measure how politicians balance ecology against others social 
and economic issue, since - given the size-bounded characterization of political programs -  an 
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increase in space devoted to environment-related  topics has to be compensated by a reduction 
of space devoted to other topics. 
Our results show that political parties’ environmentalism is strongly correlated with economic 
variables; it reveals a positive correlation with countries’ economic wealth (according to the 
prosperity  and  post-materialist  hypothesis),  and  a  negative  correlation  with  inequality  in 
wealth distribution which presumably  intensifies social conflict and impedes the discussion 
of environment-related topics. It also shows a negative correlation also with countries’ trade 
openness. Instead, objective ecological degradation as well  as variables that should reflect 
subjective feelings of this degradation does not seem to be clearly correlated with parties 
supply  of  environmentalism.  Finally,  we  find  that  parties’  ideological  orientation  is  a 
significant  driver  of  environmentalism,  left-wing  parties  being  significantly  more 
environmental-friendly than right wing ones. In this way, we confirm the early findings on the 
relationship between ideology and environmental concern from the point of view of political 
parties’ offer.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  section two presents  our  theoretical 
framework  and  the  literature,  section  three  exposes  our  data  and  models.  Section  four 
illustrates and discusses our results; finally, section five concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
The democratic political  system is  inseparable from the individuals’ abilities to formulate 
their  preferences which must be balanced by the government  in order to respect citizens’ 
choices  (Dahl,  1971).  Therefore,  public  opinion  is  a  major  determinant  of  policies  in 
democratic countries (Erikson et al., 1993; Page and Shapiro, 1983). In democratic political 
systems,  citizens  can  express  their  preferences  toward  environmental  protection  by 
interactions, (i.e. ballots, demonstrations) with the political system (Farzin and Bond, 2006). 
By voting for a party, citizens accept its political program and express their preferences on 
which kind of policies they want to see implemented for next electoral mandate. Therefore, 
parties are the link between voters’ preferences and political decision-making (Lawson, 1980; 
Dalton et al., 2011; Spoon et Klüver, 2014).
A democratic system is characterized by a three-step political game: campaign, election, and 
policy making/implementing. This article focuses on the firt one, period during which parties 
reveal electoral platforms (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Grossman and Helpman 2005), i.e., 
political parties’ ideological position. The three classic considerations which make political 
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programs core elements of the political game - information shortcuts (Franzmann and Kaiser, 
2006), select and aggregate citizens’ preferences in coherent policy packages (Klingemann et 
al., 1994), and election propaganda (Ray, 2007).  – all consider them a mean to inform voters 
about party policy preferences (Budge and Laver, 1993). Political platforms constitute a base 
for political communication (Strömberg, 2004), and a benchmark to assess commitment all 
along the mandate (Klingemann and al., 1994). 
Over the 70s, Green Parties emerged in European democracies. According to Spoon et al.  
(2014), green parties are issue-owners since “there is a spontaneous identification between 
issues relating to the environment and green politics and green parties in the mind of most 
people” (2014:366). This suggests that green parties have been created in order to answer to 
citizens’ expectations about environmental conditions. Furthermore, it also suggests that a part  
from  green  parties,  politicians  were  not  immediately  identified  as  concerned  by  the 
environment.
However,  Downs’ (1957)  model  assumes  that  political  parties  are  opportunistic  and  face 
perfect information. Under these conditions, they are able to focus on the median voter in 
order to win elections. A wide range of the existing literature has discussed political parties’ 
perfect information, their fundamental objectives (i.e. vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-
seeking) and how to achieve them (see Frey, 1978; Strom, 1990; Budge, 1994). The main idea 
is that parties face mixed-objectives. In order to implement policies, they have to be in office 
and thus win as many votes as possible, i.e “winning is not the goal but the mean” (Wittman, 
1983:143). Finally,  studies  provide  evidence  that  when  building  their  electoral 
manifestos, parties modify their positions in response of public opinion (Adam et al., 2004) 
and of voters’ opinion expressed in past election (Spoon and Klüver, 2014). 
For  example,  because  public  awareness  of  environmental  issues  has  increased  over  past 
decades,  it  may  be  argued  that  not  presenting  an  environmental  policy  would  have  a 
significant cost for parties as it should reduce votes and increase the probability of electoral 
defeat. In other words, according to the idea that political market for environmental supply 
does exist, the increase in voters’ sensitivity towards environmental issues should produce a 
shift of environmentalism in parties’  political programs (Garman, 2014;  Kirchgässner and 
Schneider, 2003).
Following a review of the literature concerning the main determinants of public support for 
environmental quality, this paper investigates whether any statistically significant link exists 
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between  determinants  of  public  awareness  for  the  environment  and  political  parties 
environmentalism. 
The existing literature  structures  the  debate about  citizens’ awareness of  the  environment 
around three main approaches: ecological,  economic and political. The former assumes that 
environmental concern is a global phenomenon whose main determinant is the perception of 
the  threat  to  nature.  On the  contrary,  the  economic  approach assumes  that  the  spread  of 
environmental  awareness  depends  upon  economic  conditions.  Indeed,  according  to  this 
perspective, environmental issues are ‘sunshine issues’ which means that they are debatable 
only when economic times are good (Dalton et al., 2013).  Finally, the latter approach focuses 
on political ideology as determinant of environmental awareness. These three approaches are 
presented in detail in the following sub-sections. 
II.1 Economic approach
A wide range of studies assumes that  public support for the environment is a function of 
economic conditions.  Individuals adjust their behavior and take environmental quality into 
account under economic constrains. As a consequence,  in the ballot,  ecological  objectives 
compete with pure voters’ economic objectives (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003, p.373). 
The economic approach includes three main hypotheses.
II.1.1 Income and wealth: the post-materialism and prosperity hypotheses
The post-materialism (Inglehart, 1977, 1990) and the prosperity hypothesis (Diekmann and 
Franzen,  1999;  Franzen,  2003;  Franzen  and  Meyer,  2010)  do  consider  income,  or  more 
generally wealth, as the core determinant of environmental concern.
Under  the  post-materialist  hypothesis,  people living in  richer  societies  are  more  likely to 
exhibit a pro-environmental behavior because of a shift in their values (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 
1995,  1997).  Indeed,  by  investigating  the  World  Value  Survey  (WWS)  data  set,  which 
explores “people’s values and beliefs, their stability or change over time, and their impact on 
social and political development of the societies in different countries of the world (Haerpfer, 
2014),  Inglehart  formulates  his  theory  about  “objective  problems  and  subjective  values” 
(1995). According to it, in contexts where economic well-being has been established material 
needs are satisfied and individuals pursue non-materialist goods such as free expression and 
life quality. On the contrary, in poorer countries, people want to solve objective and local 
environmental issues (Inglehart, 1995) without having any reference to values. In sum, in line 
with  Rostow’s  model  (Rostow,  1960),  Inglehart  postulates  a  new  stage  of  nations’ 
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development,  where  societies  consider  environmental  issues  and  life  quality  as  crucial 
because of a shift in their values. 
Under the prosperity hypothesis, rather than facing a value shift,  people make a trade-off 
between goods and environmental quality. Environment is a “luxury good” whose demand 
increases with wealth (Baumol and Oates, 1979 ; Franzen and Meyer, 2010). On the one hand, 
this hypothesis  assumes a rational choice theory under which people face a positive income 
elasticity of environmental demand. On the other hand, this perspective considers wealthier 
people as “more willing and able to reduce their standard of living in order to devote more 
resource  to  global  environmental  protection”  (Franzen,  2003,  p.299).  According  to  this 
hypothesis, individual’s marginal willingness to pay for environmental protection and overall 
willingness to pay for environmental protection have to be distinguished (Franzen and Meyer, 
2010). As societies become wealthier,  total  willingness to pay for environment  will  grow. 
However, individual’s marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality first increases 
with income, but declines in a second phase with the environmental quality’s improvement.
II.1.2 Economic instability and environment awareness: environment as “pro-cyclical 
good”
The “prosperity hypothesis” is  strengthened by Conroy and Emerson (2014) who provide 
evidences that environment is considered as a “pro-cyclical” good. By analyzing data from 
the General Social Survey (1974-2012), they find that during periods of recession, low GDP 
rate or unemployment, people are less inclined to support spending towards environment. In 
this perspective, it is not enough to simply focus on countries’ wealth. Instead, also economic 
fluctuations have to be considered as determinants of environmental awareness. Even when 
they are concerned for the environment, people disregard environmental policy when their 
economic  condition  is  threatened.  Such  a  behavior  has  substantial  consequences  during 
elections as illustrated by Horbach (1992) who provides evidences that Green Parties face 
worse electoral performances when unemployment is high. More generally, public opinion 
towards environmental issues is affected by economic stability as supported by Scruggs and 
Benegal (2012) who argue that the higher unemployment rate is, the less people believe that 
climate change is a serious issue.   
II.1.3 Wealth distribution: the inequality hypothesis
As stated by Rogers (2014), “socioeconomic inequality is now understood to be integrally 
linked  to  environmental  degradation,  climate  change,  and  blocking  of  pathways  to 
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sustainability.  “  (2014:933).  Since  Boyce  (1994)  suggestion,  some studies  investigate  the 
relationship  between  environmental  concern  and  wealth’s  distribution  by  introducing 
variables  such  as  the  Gini  index  in  their  empirical  investigations  of  the  determinants  of 
citizens’ environmental awareness (Torras and Boyce, 1998; Magnani, 2000). They stress that 
greater equality in income distribution reduces social conflict about the distribution of income 
and may favor environmental  quality  improvements.  However,  Scruggs (1998) challenges 
these  conclusions  by  suggesting  that  environmental  social  choices  are  inseparable  of 
understanding the complex interactions between actors and institutions. Heerink et al. (2001), 
then  develop  the  ‘aggregation  argument’ by  assuming  non-linearity  between  income  and 
degradation at  the household level.   They claim that  do not include a measure of income 
dispersion biases outcome at the aggregate level. 
In a public choice perspective, Weck-Hannemann follows Boyce (1994) and it’s concept of 
“power-weighted social decision rule”. She argues that the weight’s distribution of groups in 
the  political  decision  game  matters,  such  as  in  the  introduction  of  new  environmental 
regulations or alternatives policies (2004:92); she points out that some groups would behave 
without face the full opportunity costs of their decisions. 
Finally, Magnani (2000) specifically assumes that “a reduction of pollution emissions in high 
income countries is more likely to be observed if economic growth accompanies improvement  
in other social indicators, particularly income inequality” (2000:442). 
In  this  perspective,  in  a  period characterized by high inequalities  parties  would not  offer 
environmental policies since they would primarily focus on socio-economic issues. On the 
contrary, for each level of GDP per capita in developed countries, an equal wealth repartition 
would lead to a broader range of environmental sensitive citizens.
II. 1.4 The impact of international economic integration
The link between international trade and environmental policy seems ambiguous since the 
existing literature suggests that they may be exclusive or complementary. Bechtel et al. (2012) 
argue that environmental concern and preferences for trade policy are negatively correlated; 
trade affects the environment since it improves economic activities, exchanges and transports, 
therefore individuals concerned with environmental  protection would be more in  favor of 
national consumption at the expense of globalization. On the other hand, trade may not only 
favor good or services export, but also green values or green preferences and policies (Bechtel 
et al., 2012). It may also stimulate technological progress, and exchange of green technologies 
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(Copeland  and  Taylor,  2003),  or  enhance  the  adoption  of  corporate  environmental 
management systems  (Prakash and Potoski, 2006). 
II.2 Ecological approach
The environmental activism of poor nations over the 90s (Knight and Messer, 2012) led some 
scholars to question the role of wealth as the main determinant of environmental concern. By 
investigating  the  Health  of  the  Planet  (HOP)  Survey  (Dunlap,  Gallup, and  Gallup  1993; 
Dunlap and Mertig, 1995), and the World Value Survey (WVS) (Dunlap and Mertig, 1997; 
Dunlap and York, 2008; Knight and Messer 2012), these scholars  support Dunlap and Liere’s 
New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap and Liere, 1978).  According to this paradigm, 
rather than wealth, the main determinant of individual’s environmental concern would be a 
common and objective perception of environmental degradation (Knight and Messer, 2012). 
To be more concise, individuals are influenced by environmental  conditions of their place of 
living (Groot, 1967; Brechin and Kempton, 1994).
In their recent work, Dunlap and York (2008) investigate the WVS Survey and find 11 of their 
14 measures of environmental awareness significantly correlated with national wealth. They 
conclude that, compared with citizens’ of richer countries, citizens of poor countries have the 
same ability to express themselves on environmental issues and to perceive the links between 
environmental risks and sustainability. Knight and Messer (2012) strengthen the NEP through 
an empirical analysis carried out on WVS data (1990-2008); they provide evidence about the 
split between concern for local environmental problems and global environmental problems, 
and that people are willing to pay more taxes when environmental degradation is high. Their  
results also contradict the post-materialism and the wealth hypotheses by finding a negative 
and  significant  relationship  between  GDP per  capita  and citizens’ willingness  to  pay  for 
environmental protection.
Following this approach, political parties offer environmental policy in response to a global 
consensus  on  objective  environmental  conditions.  People  are  aware  of  the  importance  of 
protecting the environment because of the global threat that humans face. 
II.3 Political approach
The  latter  approach  investigates  how  ideological  preferences  are  correlated  with 
environmental  sensitivity.  Since  the  70s,  scholars  suggest  that  public  support  for  the 
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environment  varies  across  the  policy  spectrum (Liere  and  Dunlap,  1980)  and  transcends 
political cleavages (Ogden, 1971).
Tognacci  et  al.  (1972)  interview  161  persons  from  Colorado  by  way  of  two  series  of 
questions. The first ones focus on General environmental goal, the second ones on specific 
environmental  attitude.  According  to  Canstantini  and  Hanf  (1972),  their  study  provides 
evidence that Democrats and Liberals votes are more pro-environmental than Conservatives 
or Republicans, which is also supported by Dunlap and Gale (1974) who find that Democrats 
are more pro-environment voting than Republicans.
More recently, McCright et  al. (2014) have investigated the General Social  Survey (GSS) 
dataset  1972-2012.  In  line  with  the  party  sorting  theory,  they  find  a  significant  partisan 
polarization on support for government spending on environmental protection within the US 
public since 1992. Finally, Garmann (2014) has focused on relationship between ideology and 
climate policy and suggests that center and left-wing governments are more associated with 
emission abatements than right-wing. Dunlap (1975:432) identifies three explanations of this 
phenomenon:  (1)  environmental  reforms  are  generally  opposed  by  business  and  industry 
because of the costs involved, (2) environmental reforms entail an extension of government 
activities and regulation, and (3) environmental reforms often require innovative action.  
III. Data and methodology
III.1 Political parties’ environmental concern
Our analysis  primarily  relies  on  party-level  data  drawn from the  Comparative  Manifesto 
Database (CMD) (Volkens and al., 2013).  The CMD is a well-established data source built by 
a group of researcher at the Wissenschafszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) and it 
has been extensively employed by empirical studies over recent years (Cole, 2005; Netjes and 
Binnema, 2007). The database contains data that result from an in depth quantitative content 
analysis  of the political  programs released by the major parties that  took part  in national 
elections held in a number of countries from 1950 until 2010.
Due to limited data availability for CMD and non-CMD variables that were essential for our 
empirical investigation, the analysis was restricted to those parties that acted in countries and 
elections reported in  tab.  1. Parties from 20 European countries were taken into account: 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal,  Austria,  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia, 
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Slovenia,  Germany.  For  the  first  fourteen  countries  in  this  list,  which  are  all  located  in 
Western Europe, all the major parties that participated in elections held in the period 1970-
2008 are included in our sample. 
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For the five ex-communist countries in this list, instead, data are available only for the major parties that took part in elections held in the post-communist  
period; finally, German data are available only from the post-reunification era. Our final dataset includes 1,251 observations.
Sweden 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006    
Denmark 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007
Finland 1970 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
Belgium 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
Netherlands 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006
Luxembourg 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
France 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007
Italy 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008
Spain 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008
Greece 1974 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004
Portugal 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005
Austria 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008
Great Britain 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005
Ireland 1977 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997 2002 2007
Czech Republic 1992 1996 1998
Germany 1994 1998 2002 2005
 Hungary 1990 1994 1998
 Poland 1991 1993 1997 2001
 Slovakia 1992 1994 1998
 Slovenia 1992 1996 2000             
Tab. 1: Countries and elections considered in the analysis. For each country, underlined years are those whose parties were not considered in regression models run 
on restricted sample because of missing values for some country-level variables. 
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For each party the CMD records the percentage of sentences devoted to specific political 
issues in its electoral manifesto. One variable, which is labeled ENVIRONMENTALISM in 
the following analysis, specifically records the share of manifestos’ content devoted to topics 
that  are  explicitly  related  to  environmental  protection.  According  to  the  CMD  official 
description, these topics include: preservation of countryside, forests, etc. general preservation  
of natural resources against selfish interests, proper use of national  parks, soil  banks,  etc. 
environment improvement (Volkens et al., 2013b). We consider this variable as a proxy of 
parties’  environmental  concern  and,  more  specifically,  as  a  proxy  of  the  salience  of 
environmentalism in parties’ political programs. In other words, we consider this variable as 
measuring how much parties do appeal to environmentalism in order to catch votes in national  
elections.
About 15% of the parties in our sample did not devote any space to environment-related 
topics in their  programs;  for these parties ENVIRONMENTALISM assumes the value of 
zero, while for the others it ranges from 0.17 to 62.03.  Fig. 1 displays countries’ average 
values  for  this  variable  over  the  electoral  years  included  in  our  study;  looking  at  it, 
ENVIRONMENTALISM  shows  a  considerable  cross-country  and  within-country 
heterogeneity.
III.2 Covariates
In order to empirically investigate the evolution of political parties’ environmental concern 
and its correlation with parties’ characteristics, countries’ economic features and ecological 
conditions,  ENVIRONMENTALISM  was  used  as  the  dependent  variable  in  regression 
analyses  where,  following  the  theoretical  framework  depicted  in  previous  sections  and 
according  to  data  availability,  a  wide  set  of  party-level  and country-level  covariates  was 
included.  All  these  covariates  are  presented  in  the  following  subsections;  variables’ full 
description  and  their  sources  are  reported  in  tab.  2  while  tab.  3  shows  some  summary 
statistics.
12
Fig. 1: average ENVIRONMENTALISM by country over the time period considered
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Variable Description Source
ENVIRONMENTALISM % of sentences devoted to environmental issues in parties’ electoral manifestos CPM database
ECOLOGICAL PARTY Dummy =1  for Ecological parties Own elaboration based on CPM data and parties' classifications provided by 
Hellwig (2012) and Adams et al. (2006) 
RILE Right-left position of party CPM database
Ln_GDPpc Log of real GDP per capita Penn World Table (through the QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET)
GROWTH Growth rate of real GDP per capita Penn World Table (through the QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET)
TRADE Total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP in constant prices Penn World Table (through the QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET)
UNEMP Unemployment rate in percent The QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET
INDUSTRY_SHARE Share of the economy that stems from industrial production  measured as % of 
GDP
World Development indicators (through the QOG SOCIAL POLICY 
DATASET)
INFLATION Percentage change in consumer prices (all items) compared to the previous 
year
The QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET
GINI Gini index of net income inequality Solt, Frederick. 2009. “Standardizing the World Income Inequality 
Database.” Social Science Quarterly 90(2):231-242.
Log_CO2 Log of CO2 metric tons  emissions per capita World Bank
Log_SO2 Per capita Sulfur Emissions by Country Global SO2 emission by country data are from 
http://www.sterndavidi.com/datasite.html while population data are from 
World Bank
DENSITY Population density (population/squared km) Own elaboration based on population data provided by the QOG SOCIAL 
POLICY DATASET and surface data provided by World Bank
URBAN % of people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices World Bank
OLDSHARE % of population having more than 65 years THE QOG SOCIAL POLICY DATASET
TERTIARY Total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group 
following on from secondary school leaving 
World Bank
EU status Dummies for "non Eu member", "Eu member", "Eu applicant" CPM database
Tab. 2: data description and sources. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min
ENVIRONMENTALISM 1251 5.14 6.31 0 62.03 Sweden 1251 0.06 0.23 0
ECOLOGICAL_PARTY 1251 0.06 0.24 0 1 Denmark 1251 0.12 0.32 0
RILE 1251 -3.1 21.26 -74.3 78.85 Finland 1251 0.07 0.26 0
EU_member 1251 0.27 0.44 0 1 Belgium 1251 0.1 0.3 0
EU_notmember 1251 0.71 0.46 0 1 Netherlands 1251 0.07 0.25 0
EU_applicant 1251 0.03 0.17 0 1 Luxemburg 1251 0.03 0.16 0
Ln_GDPpc 1251 9.96 0.39 8.92 11.13 France 1251 0.04 0.2 0
GROWTH 1251 2.02 2.98 -12.1 9.81 Italy 1251 0.09 0.29 0
TRADE 1251 65.74 41.33 16.68 286.63 Spain 1251 0.08 0.28 0
UNEMP 1251 7.84 4.51 0.06 22.78 Greece 1251 0.03 0.17 0
INFLATION 1251 9.48 19.45 -0.27 209.93 Portugal 1251 0.07 0.25 0
Log_CO2 1251 2.14 0.4 0.85 3.7 Germany 1251 0.02 0.13 0
INDUSTRY_SHARE 1251 31.61 5.68 17.71 50.82 Austria 1251 0.04 0.2 0
OLDSHARE 1251 14.1 2.26 9.16 20.03 Great Britain 1251 0.04 0.18 0
DENSITY 1251 145.63 102.78 13.62 393.5 Ireland 1251 0.04 0.2 0
URBAN 1251 73.38 12.94 40.78 97.5 Czech Republic 1251 0.02 0.14 0
TERTIARY 1189 36.97 18.76 1.42 93.95 Hugary 1251 0.02 0.14 0
GINI 1167 27.59 4.19 20.08 35.95 Poland 1251 0.03 0.18 0
Log_SO2 1078 -10.82 0.82 -13.01 -8.63 Slovakia 1251 0.02 0.14 0
1968-1980 1251 0.23 0.42 0 1 Slovenia 1251 0.02 0.13 0
1980-1990 1251 0.23 0.42 0 1
1990-2000 1251 0.32 0.47 0 1
2000-2001 1251 0.22 0.42 0 1       
Tab. 3: summary statistics.
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III.2.1 Economic variables
According to  the prosperity  hypothesis  and to  the  post-materialism hypothesis,  countries’ 
wealth exerts a positive impact on parties environmentalism. Indeed, following the reasoning 
reported  in  section  II.1.1,  parties’ environmental  awareness  is  supposed  to  be  positively 
correlated  with  economic  well-being.  This  hypothesis  is  tested  by  the  inclusion  among 
covariates  of  countries’  real  GDP  per  capita  (transformed  in  natural  log  and  labeled 
Ln_GDPpc).
In line with the hypothesis that environment is a pro-cyclical good, which was presented and 
discussed  in  section  II.1.2,  it  makes  sense  to  suppose  that  the  better  a  countries’ 
macroeconomic  performance  is  the  greater  the  salience  of  environment  related  issues  in 
parties’ manifestos should be. In this perspective, low unemployment, contained inflation and 
sustained economic growth should positively contribute to parties’ environmental awareness. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the following covariates were added to our analysis: growth 
rate of real GDP per capita (GROWTH), inflation (INFLATION), unemployment (UNEMP).
Furthermore, in order to test whether any connection between trade and environmentalism 
effectively exists, as supposed by the literature presented in section II.1.4, our specifications 
include one covariate that measures the degree of openness of countries’ economies and is 
calculated as the sum of national exports and imports as a percentage of GDP (TRADE).
Finally, in order to test the hypothesis that wealth distribution is significantly correlated with 
parties’ environmental awareness, as theorized by the contributions presented in section II.1.3, 
countries’ Gini  index  of  net  income  inequality  (GINI)  was  also  introduced  among  the 
economic covariates following Boyce (1994) suggestion. A number of missing values were 
observed for this latter variable, therefore its use implies a sensible reduction of the sample.
III.2.2 Ecological variables
According  to  the  NEP  hypotheses,  countries’  objective  environmental  degradation  and 
individuals’ subjective feeling of this degradation are supposed to positively affect citizens’ 
demand and parties’ supply of environmentalism. 
Unfortunately,  the  availability  of  data  concern  with  environmental  degradations  is  rather 
restricted and this partially limited our test of these hypotheses. 
All the same, in order to test them, two variables were introduced among covariates with the 
purpose to measure countries’ level of atmospheric pollution; the first variable is countries’ 
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per capita amount of carbon dioxide emissions (the logarithmic transformation of this variable 
was labeled Log_CO2). The second variable is countries’ per capita sulfur dioxide emissions 
(also in this case, a logarithmic transformation of values was applied and the variable was 
labeled Log_SO2);  as  in  the case of the GINI variable,  a  number of missing values was 
observed for Log_SO2, therefore its use implies a sensible loss of observations. 
In  order  to  investigate  the  impact  on  parties’ environmentalism  arising  from  citizens’ 
subjective perception of environmental threat, following Van Liere and Dunlop (1980), we 
also included among our covariates one variable that measures the national share of people 
living in urban areas (URBAN). Indeed, in a context of high urbanization people may more 
clearly perceive the risk of environmental degradation because big cities favor noise, transport 
pollution, reduction of green spaces and, finally, expose to higher level of pollution (Tremblay 
and Dunlap, 1978 ; Torras and Boyce, 1998). Furthermore, also overpopulation may have a 
significant impact on  citizens’ subjective perception of environmental threat. For this reason, 
we  also  included  among  our  covariates  population  density  (DENSITY)  which  is  often 
considered as an important factor moderating pollution intensity (Scruggs, 1998). It is also 
presumed to be correlated with the exploitations of natural resources and in this perspective it 
also potentially affects environmental awareness.
III.2.3 Ideological variables
The empirical investigation of the relationship between political parties’ ideology and their 
environmentalism is accomplished by including two covariates in our models’ specifications. 
First,  one  dummy  variable  (ECOLOGICAL_PARTY)  that  identifies  ecological  parties 
according to the classification provided by Hellwig (2012) and Adams et al. (2006) is used. 
Parties who are overtly environmentally-oriented should dedicate a significant part of their 
manifestos to the proposal of environmentally-oriented policies to be realized; the inclusion 
among the covariates of one dummy that identify these parties allows to correctly interpret the 
effect of other variables.   
Second, in order to more precisely test the presence of any significant correlation between 
parties’ political ideology and ENVIRONMENTALISM, one variable  that measures parties’ 
right-left  ideological  position (RILE) was introduced among predictors.  This variable  was 
drawn from the  CMD and measures parties’ ideological position on a scale, built  following 
Laver and Budge (1992), which ranges from -100 to 100 with positive values associated to 
right-wing oriented parties.  
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III.2.4 Control variables
Since scholars report that people’s age is negatively correlated with their attitudes towards 
environmental  issues  (Howell  and  Laska  1992;  Carlsson  and  Johnsson-Sternman  2000), 
citizens’  age  may  be  supposed  to  exert  a  significant  influence  on  parties’  offer  of 
environmentally-oriented  policies.  Following  to  this  reasoning,  we  also  included  among 
covariates the share of >65 people on national total population (OLDSHARE). 
Citizens’ environmental  attitude has  also been found to  be significantly linked with  their 
education (Ercolano et al., 2014); it follows that when population is more highly educated 
parties’ strategy to catch votes should be based on raising ENVIRONMENTALISM. In order 
to  test  this  hypothesis  our  regression  includes  the  share  of  total  enrollment  in  tertiary 
education (ISCED 5 and 6) as a percentage of  total population in the relevant age group (this 
variable is labeled TERTIARY). Also this variable reports a considerable number of missing 
values and therefore its use implies a sensible loss of observations.
There are some reason to believe that also the characterisation of national economies may 
significantly affect  citizens’ demand and parties’ supply of environmentalism.  For example, 
industrial  production  creates  employment  and  wealth  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  exposes 
countries to environmental degradation through generation of  pollution and exploitation of 
natural  resources.  In  this  perspective,  countries  whose  economies  are  significantly 
characterized by industrial production may experience a sort of trade-off between wealth and 
environmental  degradation  and  this  may  translate  into  a  higher  or  lower 
ENVIRONMENTALISM.  People may ask for more environmentally-oriented policies aimed 
at reducing the industrial sector on the environment or, on the contrary, they may prefer less  
environmentalism to  avoid  the  imposition  of  constraints  to  economic  activities.  With  the 
purpose to empirically test whether any link between the relevance of industrial production in 
national economy and parties environmental concern actually exists, one variable measuring 
the industrial sector share of national GDP (INDUSTRY_SHARE) was introduced among our 
covariates. 
Moreover,  our  predictors  include  dummies  that  identify  countries’ EU membership  status 
(member,  applicant,  non-member  with  the  latter  used  as  reference  category).  Indeed,  the 
“environment is actually at the heart of EU policy” (European Union, 2013, p. 5) since the 
Treaty on European Union set members’ duty to work towards “a high level of protection and 
improvement  of the quality  of the environment” (Article  3).  Therefore,  it  makes sense to 
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investigate whether being part of the EU is correlated with an higher parties’ environmental 
concern. 
Finally, our set of covariates includes countries’ and decades’ dummies (1970-1980 which is 
used  as  reference  category;  1980-1990;  1990-2000;  2000-2010)  in  order  to  account  for 
unobserved cross-country and cross-period heterogeneity.
III.3 Methodology
The empirical approach adopted to carry out our regression analyses mainly relies on De 
Simone and Sapio (2013) and has three features that are worth noting. 
First,  our empirical  analysis  treats  the  party-data  in  our sample  as a pooled  cross-section 
because  parties’ transformations,  merges  and  disappears  over  time  did  not  allow a  panel 
dataset to be built without deleting a significant number of observations.
Second, our estimates are primarily carried out using OLS with standard errors clustered at 
country  level.  Besides,  as  was  stressed  in  section  III.1,  our  dependent  variable  is  a 
percentage/proportion  and  therefore  has  a  bounded  nature.  Scholars  have  highlighted  the 
inappropriateness  of  OLS in  case  of  regression  analyses  with  such  a  dependent  variable 
(Kieschnick  and  McCullough,  2003);  indeed,  when  a  bounded  dependent  variable  is 
investigated, OLS may lead to impossible predictions, non-normality of the error terms may 
arise and  heteroskedasticity potentially affects the reliability of the estimates. 
In order to overcome these potential biases, we checked the robustness of our OLS results by 
adopting  the Fractional logit model (FRACLOG - Papke and Wooldridge, 1996), and the 
Zero-Inflated Beta model (ZIB), which were both carried out by adjusting the estimates for 
clustering at country level. The Fractional logit model assumes that “ the expected value of 
the dependent variable is a logit function of the explanatory variables with the error term 
supposed to be homoskedastic and  Gaussian” (De Simone and Sapio, 2013, p.9). This model 
is suitable “for handling proportions data in which zeros and ones may appear as well as 
intermediate values”  (Baum, 2009, p. 301). Nevertheless, a further problem that we had to 
keep in mind when choosing our empirical strategy arises from the fact that the number of 
observations  in  our  final  dataset  that  show a value of  zero  for  the dependent  variable  is  
particularly relevant, as we reported in section III.1. The use of the Zero-Inflated Beta model 
is a solution to this additional problem. Indeed, this model is made up of two parts; a logistic 
regression model is used to investigate the probability that the dependent variable equals 0 
and a Beta regression model (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004)  is used to estimate the impact 
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of covariates on non-zero proportions. As highlighted by De Simone and SApio (2013), the 
ZIB  estimation  technique  reproduces  the  two-step  decision  making  process  which  is 
presumably carried out by political parties: they choose the salience of environmental issues 
in their political manifestos only once they have decided that environmental concern has to be 
reported.
Third,  given the unavoidable adoption of a pooled cross-section treatment of our data and the 
absence of exogenously determined variation, the identification of causality links among our 
variables  is  questionable;  therefore  our  analysis  has  to  be  intended  as  the  search  for 
robust ceteris paribus correlations.
IV. Results and Discussion
We  present  our  results  following  the  guideline  exposed  in  the  theoretical  framework. 
Economic variables are the main determinants of platforms greening up while we do not find 
statistical  support  for  the  ecological  approach.  However,  we  provide  strong evidences  of 
ideology as core element of political platforms’ greening-up.
IV. 1 Economic Approach:
Looking at the tables, a first relevant finding is that the prosperity and the post-materialism 
hypotheses are strongly supported by our empirical analyses. Indeed, all the specifications run 
with OLS find a positive and significant coefficient for the natural logarithm of real GDP per  
capita.  This  result  is  strongly  confirmed  by  the  FRACLOG  and  the  ZIB  estimations. 
Statistical significance of this result varies across specifications, but it is at least p<0.10 with 
only few exceptions. According to this result, the wealthier the country where parties act is, 
the higher the saliency of environment-related topics in their manifestos is. In this perspective,  
wealth  positively  affects  citizen  demand  for  environment  related  policies  which,  in  turn, 
translates into a higher supply of environmentalism by parties.
Definitely clearer and more robust results are obtained for the inequality hypothesis which 
could be tested only with the reduced sample due to missing values reported by the GINI 
variable. The GINI index reports a negative coefficient in all the specification run with the 
OLS model and this result is strongly confirmed by the FRACLOG and the ZIB models. In 
the  OLS  model  this  negative  correlation  of  economic  inequality  with  parties’ 
environmentalism turns out to be statistically significant in models 4 and 5 while in model 6, 
after the inclusion of countries’ dummies, the coefficient for this variable is not significant 
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anymore. Besides, in the FRACLOG and ZIB models the negative sign for this variable is 
statistically significant also when countries dummies were added.
These results suggest that the higher (lower) countries’ inequality is the lower (higher) is the 
space devoted to environmentally-oriented policies in parties’ political manifestos. This leads 
to  accepting  the  inequality  hypothesis  according to  which  the  dialogue on environmental 
issues is favored by reduction of social conflicts arising from unequal wealth distribution.
Such results are consistent with our hypothesis on repartition: all things equal, the most equal 
economies would be the better  environmental friendly societies. Indeed, for each level  of 
GDP per capita, a more equal wealth distribution seems to be understood as a broader range 
of environmental sensitive citizens by political parties.
An economy where the biggest part of wealth is owned by an elite would probably have few 
perspectives  for  an  environmental  friendly  society.  First,  because  such  elite  would  be 
composed  by  businessmen  and  industrialists  who  should  have  to  support  costs  (Dunlap, 
1975).  Second,  because  the  rest  of  the  population  would  have  to  face  other  priorities, 
according  to  the  post-materialist  hypothesis.  Finally,  it  leads  to  an  unbalanced  “power-
weighted  social  decision  rule”  (Boyce,  1994),  one  more  reason  that  would  keep 
environmental issues to enter into political programs.
However, not all the other macroeconomic covariates included in our models provide as much 
significant results as GDP per capita. Indeed, GROWTH turns to be statistically insignificant 
and this result is robust across models and alternative specifications. INFLATION, instead, 
reports a positive and significant coefficient only in model 6 where the reduced sample is 
considered and GINI, TERTIARY and SO2 are included in the specification together with our 
original set of covariates and with countries’ dummies. However, this result is clearly reported 
only  by  the  FRACLOG  estimates  while  it  is  slightly  significant  with  OLS  and  totally 
insignificant in the ZIB model.
Inconsistent  results  are found for UNEMP for which a negative barely significant  sign is 
reported  in some of the OLS and FRACLOG specifications run with the complete sample 
while  an opposite  but  even in  this  case  slightly significant  positive  result  is  found when 
moving to the reduced sample. Besides, also this result is not robust across  specifications and 
is no longer significant when looking at the ZIB models.
On the whole, looking at the results for these three variables, there is not a highly significant 
relation between parties’ appeal to environment-related policies in order to gain votes and 
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macroeconomic conditions and, therefore, environment is not clearly interpreted as a “pro-
cyclical good”.
 
OLS 
model 1
OLS  
model 2
OLS 
model 3
OLS
model 4
OLS 
model 5
OLS
model 6
ECOLOGICAL_PARTY 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.148***
(3.84) (3.73) (3.77) (3.54) (3.47) (3.46)
RILE -0.000347*** -0.000429*** -0.000346** -0.000427*** -0.000455*** -0.000367**
(-3.12) (-3.70) (-2.84) (-3.56) (-3.59) (-2.76)
Ln_GDPpc 0.0425** 0.0398** 0.0549* 0.0286*** 0.0296*** 0.0606**
(2.11) (2.20) (1.94) (2.91) (3.12) (2.39)
GROWTH -0.000487 -0.0000394 0.000673 -0.000823 -0.000669 0.000933
(-0.56) (-0.05) (1.11) (-0.73) (-0.65) (1.19)
TRADE -0.0000556 -0.000128 -0.000567*** -0.0000845 -0.000113 -0.000513**
(-0.55) (-1.50) (-2.96) (-1.14) (-1.44) (-2.31)
UNEMP 0.000260 -0.00126* -0.000377 0.000828* -0.000192 0.0000228
(0.41) (-2.07) (-0.60) (1.75) (-0.41) (0.03)
INFLATION -0.0000479 -0.0000579 0.000104 -0.000161 -0.000127 0.000169*
(-0.51) (-0.54) (1.07) (-1.36) (-1.16) (2.05)
Log_CO2 0.00787 0.00436 -0.00148 0.00980 0.0103 -0.00215
(0.57) (0.35) (-0.08) (1.32) (1.48) (-0.13)
DENSITY -0.0000394 -0.0000344 -0.000894** -0.0000330 -0.0000330 -0.00149***
(-0.71) (-0.67) (-2.59) (-0.85) (-0.88) (-4.02)
URBAN -0.000190 0.00000789 0.00289*** -0.00110** -0.000975** 0.00331***
(-0.44) (0.02) (3.46) (-2.46) (-2.19) (3.36)
INDUSTRY_SHARE 0.000433 0.000613 0.00132 0.000802 0.000887 0.000389
(0.59) (0.90) (1.27) (1.43) (1.64) (0.42)
OLDSHARE 0.00220 0.00115 0.00142 0.00743*** 0.00647*** 0.00390
(0.77) (0.40) (0.46) (3.63) (2.94) (1.53)
EU_member -0.0297*** -0.0241*** -0.0275*** -0.0241*** -0.0234*** -0.0282***
(-3.29) (-3.04) (-3.21) (-3.43) (-3.62) (-3.35)
EU_applicant -0.0201*** -0.0164** 0.000692 -0.0314*** -0.0241** 0.00206
(-3.40) (-2.48) (0.12) (-3.31) (-2.69) (0.34)
1980s-1990s 0.0256*** 0.0210** 0.0158*** 0.0135*
(5.99) (2.78) (2.96) (1.83)
1990s-2000 0.0313*** 0.0367** 0.0139 0.0303**
(3.88) (2.79) (1.72) (2.13)
2000-2010 0.0164 0.0314* -0.00681 0.0243
(1.59) (1.89) (-0.81) (1.38)
GINI -0.00292*** -0.00225*** -0.00155
(-3.82) (-3.07) (-1.71)
Log_SO2 -0.00358 -0.00244 0.00151
(-0.63) (-0.42) (0.21)
TERTIARY -0.00000402 0.000286 -0.000323
(-0.02) (1.58) (-1.31)
Country dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 1251 1251 1251 949 949 949   
log likelihood 1978.40 2000.24 2061.61 1596.87 1606.79 1641.09   
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.53   
Tab. 4: OLS  pooled cross-sectional estimates; the dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTALISM. coefficients and t 
statistics (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered at country level were applied to all models. In models 4, 5 and 6 
all the observations related to countries and years underlined in tab. 1 were not considered due to missing values. * 
p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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FRACLOG 
model 1
FRACLOG 
model 2
FRACLOG 
model 3
FRACLOG 
model 4
FRACLOG 
model 5
FRACLOG 
model 6   
ECOLOGICAL_PARTY 0.0681*** 0.0640*** 0.0651*** 0.0681*** 0.0661*** 0.0674***
(5.34) (5.02) (5.54) (5.09) (4.85) (5.07)   
RILE -0.000348** -0.000437*** -0.000355** -0.000387*** -0.000418*** -0.000352** 
(-2.54) (-3.00) (-2.39) (-3.06) (-2.90) (-2.32)   
Ln_GDPpc 0.0444* 0.0372* 0.0598** 0.0331*** 0.0335*** 0.0716***
(1.88) (1.74) (2.07) (2.66) (2.65) (2.65)   
GROWTH -0.000522 0.0000435 0.000669 -0.000933 -0.000604 0.000595   
(-0.62) (0.06) (1.06) (-1.04) (-0.70) (0.73)   
TRADE -0.0000564 -0.000120 -0.000475** 0.00000134 -0.0000407 -0.000405*  
(-0.57) (-1.61) (-2.24) (0.02) (-0.49) (-1.84)   
UNEMP 0.000474 -0.00112* 0.000365 0.00116* 0.000103 0.00124** 
(0.66) (-1.71) (0.71) (1.79) (0.18) (2.27)   
INFLATION -0.0000489 -0.0000466 0.000129 -0.000192 -0.000149 0.000186***
(-0.42) (-0.38) (1.43) (-1.52) (-1.30) (2.85)   
Log_CO2 0.00729 0.00431 0.0137 0.00613 0.00590 0.0145   
(0.54) (0.36) (0.77) (0.77) (0.73) (0.80)   
DENSITY -0.0000266 -0.0000216 -0.000700 -0.00000147 -0.00000415 -0.000816** 
(-0.49) (-0.45) (-1.57) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-2.50)   
URBAN -0.000182 0.0000174 0.00170 -0.00128*** -0.00111** 0.000763   
(-0.47) (0.05) (1.49) (-2.76) (-2.34) (0.76)   
INDUSTRY_SHARE 0.000450 0.000634 0.00170 0.000647 0.000715 0.000696   
(0.60) (0.92) (1.39) (1.08) (1.29) (0.79)   
OLDSHARE 0.00207 0.00109 0.000667 0.00669*** 0.00576*** 0.00365*  
(0.81) (0.45) (0.28) (4.41) (3.45) (1.73)   
EU_member -0.0284*** -0.0214*** -0.0295*** -0.0225*** -0.0202*** -0.0286***
(-3.39) (-3.15) (-3.96) (-3.04) (-3.47) (-4.58)   
EU_applicant -0.0256*** -0.0242*** -0.00791 -0.0462*** -0.0382*** -0.0103   
(-3.38) (-3.55) (-1.22) (-3.66) (-3.25) (-1.37)   
1980s-1990s 0.0297*** 0.0275*** 0.0203*** 0.0167*  
(4.58) (2.98) (2.70) (1.87)   
1990s-2000 0.0360*** 0.0440*** 0.0208* 0.0288** 
(3.48) (2.81) (1.79) (1.99)   
2000-2010 0.0239* 0.0418** 0.00534 0.0230   
(1.84) (2.21) (0.49) (1.59)   
GINI -0.00302*** -0.00239*** -0.00227***
(-3.42) (-2.92) (-2.61)   
Log_SO2 0.00116 0.00241 0.00288   
(0.24) (0.52) (0.37)   
TERTIARY 0.000131 0.000278* -0.0000143   
(0.87) (1.91) (-0.06)   
Country dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 1251 1251 1251 949 949 949   
Tab. 5: Fractional logit pooled cross-sectional estimates; the dependent variable is ENVIRONMENTALISM. 
coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered at country level were applied to all models. In 
models 4, 5 and 6 all the observations related to countries and years underlined in tab. 1 were not considered due to 
missing values.  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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ZIB 
model 1
ZIB 
model 2
ZIB 
model 3
ZIB 
model 4
ZIB 
model 5
ZIB 
model 6
ECOLOGICAL_PARTY 0.0759*** 0.0695*** 0.0739*** 0.0760** 0.0722** 0.0786** 
(2.99) (2.89) (3.02) (2.32) (2.30) (2.33)   
RILE -0.000204** -0.000280*** -0.000249*** -0.000230** -0.000269** -0.000222** 
(-2.30) (-2.99) (-2.71) (-2.11) (-2.53) (-1.98)   
Ln_GDPpc 0.0281* 0.0270* 0.0413** 0.0264*** 0.0290*** 0.0441** 
(1.80) (1.94) (2.55) (3.46) (4.05) (2.36)   
GROWTH -0.000330 -0.0000455 0.000300 -0.000249 -0.0000802 0.000323   
(-0.57) (-0.09) (0.57) (-0.39) (-0.15) (0.55)   
TRADE -0.0000914 -0.000121* -0.000395*** -0.0000984* -0.000127** -0.000246   
(-1.08) (-1.70) (-3.41) (-1.72) (-2.32) (-1.57)   
UNEMP 0.000206 -0.000637 -0.0000757 0.000610 0.0000494 0.000141   
(0.39) (-1.29) (-0.19) (1.55) (0.13) (0.37)   
INFLATION -0.0000527 -0.0000533 0.0000296 -0.0000931 -0.0000787 0.0000617   
(-0.58) (-0.63) (0.39) (-1.34) (-1.26) (1.09)   
Log_CO2 0.0142 0.0109 0.000484 0.0127** 0.0109** -0.00189   
(1.42) (1.29) (0.04) (2.33) (2.32) (-0.17)   
DENSITY -0.0000371 -0.0000333 -0.000325 -0.0000239 -0.0000233 -0.000420   
(-0.81) (-0.80) (-1.28) (-0.75) (-0.73) (-1.43)   
URBAN -0.000291 -0.000176 0.000493 -0.000870*** -0.000771** 0.000242   
(-0.95) (-0.64) (0.74) (-2.90) (-2.50) (0.31)   
INDUSTRY_SHARE -0.0000225 0.000138 0.000742 0.0000433 0.000129 0.000181   
(-0.05) (0.34) (0.96) (0.12) (0.37) (0.27)   
OLDSHARE 0.00159 0.00111 0.00240 0.00356*** 0.00297** 0.00342** 
(0.90) (0.66) (1.56) (2.97) (2.52) (2.08)   
EU_member -0.0236*** -0.0190*** -0.0177*** -0.0193*** -0.0172*** -0.0150*  
(-3.08) (-3.20) (-2.64) (-2.69) (-2.91) (-1.91)   
EU_applicant -0.0121*** -0.0106*** -0.00564 -0.0177*** -0.0136*** -0.00470   
(-3.62) (-3.07) (-1.51) (-4.26) (-3.22) (-1.28)   
1980s-1990s 0.0159*** 0.0107* 0.00959*** 0.00710   
(4.02) (1.91) (2.82) (1.47)   
1990s-2000 0.0213*** 0.0206** 0.0131*** 0.0163*  
(4.38) (2.24) (3.04) (1.90)   
2000-2010 0.0101 0.0158 0.00132 0.0107   
(1.57) (1.33) (0.27) (0.92)   
GINI -0.00188*** -0.00157*** -0.000871*  
(-3.22) (-2.66) (-1.74)   
Log_SO2 0.000181 0.000993 0.00377   
(0.04) (0.26) (0.61)   
TERTIARY 0.0000629 0.0000997 -0.000137   
(0.70) (1.08) (-0.57)   
Country dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 1251 1251 1251 949 949 949   
Tab. 6: Zero-inflated Beta regression pooled cross-sectional  estimates the dependent variable is 
ENVIRONMENTALISM. coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered at country level were 
applied to all models. In models 4, 5 and 6 all the observations related to countries and years underlined in tab. 1 were 
not considered due to missing values. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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These results are consistent with institutionalization processes and path dependency. Once a 
level of standard of living reached, citizens will vote for new institutions and regulations in 
favor of environmental protection (Arrow et al. 1995).
However, whether individuals are sensitive to economic cycle for their private consumption 
of  environmental  goods,  environmentalism  policy  supply  faces  an  “institutional  ratchet-
effect”  (Armingeon,  2007),  which  undo  cycle-effect.  Governments  cannot  escape  from 
environmental  public  goods’ provision  once  they  are  engaged  in.  Hence,  whatever  the 
economical cycle, parties have to commit on this topic. Such conclusion gives consistency to 
the idea of a ‘greening-up by thresholds‘. Grossman and Krueger (1995) for example, identify 
a  turning  point  of  the  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  environment/development  for  an 
income’s level of less than 8000$ (1985). Rather than development’s trend, the absolute level 
of GDP matters, reflecting a short-term’s inertia.
Finally,  a  negative  correlation  is  found  between  environmentalism  saliency  in  parties’ 
manifestos  and countries’ economic  openness as  measured by the variable  TRADE.  This 
result is highly statistically significant in the OLS, FRACCLOG and ZIB specifications that 
include countries’ dummies and investigate the whole sample at our disposal (model 3). Some 
significance, anyway,  is also found in the other specifications.
According  to  this  results  trade  openness  and  environmental  policy  saliency  in  parties’ 
manifestos seem to be mutually exclusive. Such result is not surprising given the idea that 
ecological  ecology  “competes”  with  other  interests  in  the  ballot,  especially  with  “pure” 
economic  objective  (Kirchgässner  and  Schneider  2002:373).  Political  parties  make  the 
assumption  that  citizens  associate  rather  trade  with  globalization  and  environmental 
degradation than with green technology transfers and a global sustainability’s improvement.
IV.2 Ecological Approach
The  correlation  of  parties’ environmentalism  with  objective  measures  of  environmental 
degradation does not find strong support in our results.
More in detail, Log_SO2 reports non significant results in all the models and specifications 
adopted.  Moreover,  the  Log_CO2  variable  reports  an  inconsistent  and  statistically  non 
significant result is all the OLS specifications and a positive but not significant impact on 
parties’ environmentalism in  all  the  FRACLOG specifications.  When  turning  to  the  ZIB 
models,  this  variable  shows  a  positive  and  p<0.10  significant  effect  on  parties’ 
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environmentalism when the restricted sample is considered and only in models 4 and 5. While 
this result is in line with expectations, it does not hold when countries’ dummies are included 
in model 6.
According  to  these  findings  the  saliency  of  environmental  concern  in  political  parties 
programs is  not  strongly  correlated  with  national  objective  environmental  degradation  as 
measured by air pollution. In other words, for political parties it is not worthwhile to provide 
more environmental-oriented electoral programs as a response to a higher objective level of 
toxic emission.
We first presume that one of the reasons of such misadjustment is the complex understanding 
of objective natural conditions’ states. Second, following Downs (1957), rational ignorance 
may occur when the cost of improving his knowledge exceed the expected benefit. In this 
perspective,  cost  and  availability  of  information  are  the  core  determinants  of  the 
understanding process. It seems reasonable to assume that environmental information is both, 
less available for public  than  economic ones,  and complex to  interpret.  Kirchgässner  and 
Schneider (2002) also suggest that a lag could occur between environmental improvement 
consecutive to political  measure,  and voters’ discount  rate.  Finally, we presume that local 
environmental  data  would  offer  better  results:  voters  would  probably  better  valuate  local 
conditions because they are closed to their direct environment.
The  two  variables  which  are  presumably  correlated  with  citizens’ subjective  measures  of 
environmental degradation do not exhibit clear results.
URBAN reports inconsistent results. In model 3 and model 6 calculated through OLS it turns 
out to be highly significant (p<0.01) and a positive coefficient is found. This finding reveals 
that the saliency of environment related topics in parties manifesto is positively correlated 
with  the  proportion  of  population  living  in  cities  which  presumably  affects  people’s 
perception of environmental. Nevertheless, this result is not robust across the models, as its 
significance is not confirmed by model 3 and 6 run by FRACLOG and ZIB. Furthermore, in 
the  FRACLOG  and  ZIB  model  4  and  5,  where  countries’ dummies  are  not  considered, 
URBAN shows an opposite negative result. This reveals that this variable presumably has 
different effects when moving from a between to a within country analysis.
Not completely clear results are also obtained for the DENSITY variable. It reports a negative 
correlation in all our models and specification but this result is significant only in models 3 
and 6 run with OLS and in model 6 run with FRACLOG. No significance is reported by the 
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ZIB estimations.    Also in this case this mixed result does not allow to clearly support the 
hypotheses  concerning  the  link  between  citizens’  subjective  feeling  of  environmental 
degradation and political parties’ environmentalism.
Following the distinction made by Heerink et al. (2001), we suggest that on one hand, Density 
and Urbanization may be perceived as a threat for the environment because of a ‘scale effect’, 
i.e.  that more population and more urbanization,  ceteris  paribus,  would result  into higher 
levels of pollution and waste. On the other hand, they may be offset by a ‘composing effect’ 
and a ‘technique effect’ through, such as public transport and waste treatment (Batabyal and 
Nijkamp, 2013; Bulkeley and Bestill, 2005). In other words, results obtained reflect for a part 
that our indicators do not capture qualitative insights, which differ across cities and countries.
IV.3 The impact of political variables: strong support
Moving  to  the  examination  party-level  political  covariates,  the  OLS estimates  show that 
parties’ environmental  awareness is  strongly significantly correlated with their  ideological 
orientations. This result is confirmed by the FRACLOG and the ZIB models.
First, as it was expected, the dummy variable ECOLOGICAL_PARTY shows a positive and 
highly significant coefficient, meaning that environmentalism is considerably more salient for 
these kinds of parties. Looking at the coefficients in the OLS specifications and at marginal 
effects  I  the  FRACLOG  and  ZIB  specifications,  among  our  covariates  the 
ECOLOGICAL_PARTY dummy is the variable that reveals the highest correlation with the 
saliency of environmentalism in parties’ manifestos.
Second,  our  findings strongly support the  hypothesis  that the more right-wing (left-wing) 
oriented parties are, the less (more) they appeal to environmentalism to catch votes. In other 
words,  environmental  concern is  a  subject  which  is  significantly  more  used by left-wing 
parties in order to attract the attention of the electorate.
This result clearly provides a robust Europe-centered confirmation of the results provided by 
Americans’ contributions (Dunlap, 1975; McCright et al., 2014). More interesting, whether 
American  contributions  focus  on  the  relationship  between  individual  preferences  for 
environment  and ideology,  we confirm these  results  from the political  parties’ offer  side. 
Therefore our results are positioned in the line of those who found a positive link between 
governments’ left-wing orientation and awareness for climate policy looking at recent OECD 
data (Scruggs, 1999; Garmann, 2014).
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IV.4 Results for control variables
Moving to the examination of the results obtained for control variables, it is worth noting that  
only few of them are found to be significantly correlated with the saliency of environment-
related proposals in parties’ manifestos.
A  positive ceteris  paribus correlation  with  our  dependent  variable  is  found  for  the 
INDUSTRY_SHARE variable  in all our specifications and models but this result is never 
significant; it follows that the saliency of industrial production in national economies does not 
translate in a higher or lower environmentalism in the political arena.
Not significant results are also obtained for the TERTIARY variable which was supposed to 
be a good proxy of countries’ level of education. According to this finding, parties appeal to 
environmentalism in order to catch votes does not depend upon citizens’ education.
OLDSHARE, instead, reports a significant and, quite surprisingly, positive correlation with 
our dependent variable in almost all the models based on the restricted sample. This result is 
robust to model shifting from OLS to FRACLOG and ZIB. Not significant results, instead, 
are obtained when the whole sample is considered.
Our OLS findings clearly indicate that parties in the EU area and EU applicants do pay lower 
attention  to  environment-related  topics  in  order  to  catch votes.  Indeed,  the  dummies  that 
identify EU member countries and applicants’ countries show a highly significant negative 
correlation  with  our  dependent  variable  in  all  the  specifications.  This  result  is  strongly 
confirmed by the FRACLOG and the  ZIB models.  This finding may arise  from the high 
pressure that EU policy and institutions put on environmental issues which, for this reason, 
may be not considered anymore by parties as national issues they can appeal to in order to 
gain votes.
Finally,  decade’s dummies reveal that  political  parties do devote more space in their  programs to 
environment-related  issues  during the  1980s  and  the  1990s  compared  with  1970s.  With  few 
exceptions, this result is robust across models and to alternative specifications
V. Conclusion
In recent years a broad literature has theoretically and empirically analyzed in profound way 
the determinants of individuals’ environmental awareness. In democratic countries citizens’ 
preferences  have  to  translate  into  political  parties  before  they  can  turn  into  environment 
friendly policies. At the same time, parties’ do exploit environmentalism in order to catch 
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votes.  This  is  why  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  drivers  of  political  parties’ supply  of 
environmentalism is particularly interesting. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provided the first empirical analysis of the drivers of 
political parties’ environmentalism in European countries using data that cover all the major 
parties that tool part in national elections over more than 30 years, from the 1970s to the 
present day.  
Quite surprisingly, our results show that political parties’ supply of environmentalism is not 
clearly  significantly  correlated  with  variables  that  measure  objective  environmental 
degradation nor it is clearly correlated with variables that should affect citizens’ subjective 
feelings of this degradation. Instead, it is strongly correlated with economic variables; indeed, 
our results strongly support the prosperity and post-materialism hypothesis by revealing that 
parties’  environmentalism  is  positively  correlated  with  countries’  economic  wealth. 
Furthermore, we show that inequality in wealth distribution negatively affects the political 
supply of environmentalism since it presumably intensifies social conflict and impedes the 
discussion of environment-related topics.  Finally,  we provide robust evidence that parties’ 
ideological orientation is a significant driver of environmentalism with left-wing parties who 
are significantly more environmental-friendly than right wing ones.
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